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WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
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 The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), as amended, limits judicial 
review of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) cleanup programs. 
However, we conclude that when the EPA sues to recover initial 
expenditures incurred in curing a polluted site, a district court 
may review a property owner's bona fide allegations that 
continuance of the project will cause irreparable harm to public 
health or the environment and, in appropriate circumstances, 
grant equitable relief.  Because the district court in this case 
believed that it lacked jurisdiction under these circumstances, 
we will reverse its order denying injunctive relief.   
 Defendant Gamma-Tech owns real property above the 
Passaic Formation aquifer in Rocky Hill, New Jersey.  After 
trichloroethylene (TCE) contamination was discovered in the 
groundwater at two sites on Gamma-Tech property, they were placed 
on the National Priorities List, a list of hazardous waste sites 
that require the use of Superfund money under CERCLA.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(B).  In 1984, the EPA arranged for a remedial 
investigation and feasibility study preliminary to cleaning up 
the contamination.  The agency issued its first Record of 
Decision in 1987 calling for installation of an alternative water 
supply and sealing of private wells at one site.   
 After further investigation and monitoring of the 
contamination, the EPA issued a second Record of Decision in 1988 
outlining its plan for a remedy.  In brief, the EPA proposed to 
extract contaminated water from the primary contamination plume 
in the shallow aquifer, to treat it, and then to reinject it into 
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the aquifer.  In addition, the plan provided for the installation 
of "open-hole" wells that penetrate through the shallow source to 
the deep aquifer to allow for monitoring and sampling.  After the 
decision was announced, the public and potentially responsible 
parties were given the opportunity to comment on the plan.    
 At least some of the proposed wells have already been 
installed on the property, but the pump treatment system has not 
yet been fully implemented.  The final design was expected to be 
completed in the fall of 1993 and the remedial process begun in 
the spring of 1994.  It is anticipated that the cleanup will be 
completed in five to seven years.  
 In 1991, the EPA brought suit against Gamma-Tech 
pursuant to CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), seeking reimbursement of 
"response costs" already incurred at the two sites.  The agency 
also sought a declaratory judgment on Gamma-Tech's liability for 
future response costs.   
 Gamma-Tech filed a cross-motion for a preliminary 
injunction directing the EPA to cease the installation of open-
hole wells into the deep layer of the aquifer, to encase existing 
open-hole wells, and to cease construction of the remedial system 
provided for in the 1988 decision (the water extraction and 
treatment plan).  In support of its motion, Gamma-Tech asserted 
that the EPA's selected remedy will exacerbate the existing 
environmental damage and cause further irreparable harm to the 
environment.  According to Gamma-Tech, the system devised by the 
EPA will cause contaminated water from the shallow strata of the 
aquifer to be drawn down into the deep zone where contamination 
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has not been established conclusively, thus increasing, rather 
than remedying, the pollution of the water supply. 
 The district court concluded that it lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction to grant Gamma-Tech's request for injunctive 
relief.  The court based its conclusion on the general principle, 
garnered from statutory and decisional law, that district courts 
have no jurisdiction over claims challenging the EPA's choice of 
remedies until after completion of a distinct phase of the 
cleanup.   
 Appealing under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), Gamma-Tech 
asserts that once the EPA brought its cost-recovery suit under 
CERCLA, the general jurisdictional bar to the review of 
challenges was lifted pursuant to the cost-recovery action 
exception under 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(1).  The district court thus 
had authority to grant an injunction even though the remedial 
work has not yet been completed.  Gamma-Tech also contends that 
it was denied due process and that the district court erred in 
denying leave to file a supplemental pleading adding claims for 
damages. 
I. 
 By enacting CERCLA, Congress intended to combat the 
hazards that toxic waste sites pose to public health or the 
environment.  The EPA was granted broad powers to eliminate or 
reduce toxic contamination in the environment by either requiring 
responsible parties to clean up the sites, 42 U.S.C. § 9606, or 
by undertaking the task itself, 42 U.S.C. § 9604.   
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 Because of the menace to public health and the 
environment, Congress was anxious to safeguard EPA remedial 
efforts from delay resulting from litigation brought by 
potentially responsible parties.  See Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. 
EPA, 777 F.2d 882, 886-87 (3d Cir. 1985); Wheaton Indus. v. EPA, 
781 F.2d 354, 356 (3d Cir. 1986).  In the Superfund Amendments 
and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Congress adopted a "clean 
up first, litigate later" philosophy.  See 132 Cong. Rec. 28,409 
(1986) (statement of Sen. Stafford) (Congress wanted to avoid 
"specious suits [that] would slow cleanup and enable private 
parties to avoid or at least delay paying their fair share of 
cleanup costs."). 
 SARA generally bars preliminary judicial review of 
challenges to the EPA's response actions.  42 U.S.C. § 9613(h), 
entitled "Timing of review," provides in pertinent part:   
"No Federal court shall have jurisdiction 
under Federal law . . . to review any 
challenges to removal or remedial action 
selected under section 9604 . . . in any 
action except one of the following: 
  
 (1) An action under section 9607 of 
this title to recover response costs or 
damages or for contribution. 
 
*   *   * 
 
 (4)  An action under section 9659 of 
this title (relating to citizens suits) 
alleging that the removal or remedial action 
taken under section 9604 of this title or 
secured under 9606 of this title was in 
violation of any requirement of this chapter. 
. . ."  
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 The language in section 9613(h) demonstrates Congress' 
intent that the EPA be free to conduct prompt and expeditious 
cleanups without obstructive legal entanglements.  By providing 
several exceptions to the timeliness bar, however, Congress 
recognized that the limitation on court challenges should not be 
absolute.   
 We now examine the exceptions listed in subsections 
9613(h)(1) and (h)(4) in greater detail to determine when those 
exceptions would serve to lift the jurisdictional bar to 
challenges to response actions.  In so doing, we note that it is 
helpful to bear in mind that the word "jurisdiction" has a 
variety of meanings and can refer to a court's power to review a 
matter in any aspect, or to a limited degree, or in a specified 
venue, or by restricting the time when an action can be brought. 
A.  Cost-Recovery Action Exception Under Subsection 9613(h)(1). 
 The exclusion under subsection 9613(h)(1) retains 
jurisdiction in the federal courts after a cost-recovery or 
contribution action has been brought by the government under 42 
U.S.C. § 9607 of CERCLA.  Section 9607 permits the EPA to sue a 
potentially responsible party for reimbursement of response 
costs.0   
 It is the cost-recovery suit that opens the door for 
alleged responsible parties to contest their liability as well as 
to challenge the EPA's response action as being unnecessarily 
                                                           
042 U.S.C. § 9601(25) defines the terms "respond" or "response" 
as meaning:  "[R]emove, removal, remedy, and remedial action, all 
such terms (including the terms `removal' and `remedial action') 
include enforcement activities related thereto." 
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expensive or otherwise not in accordance with applicable law. See 
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (permits challenges against costs 
inconsistent with National Contingency Plan); id. § 9607(b) (sets 
out defenses to liability); id. § 9613(j)(2) (arbitrary and 
capricious standard of review applies to response actions).  The 
language in subsection 9613(h)(1), the corresponding legislative 
history, and relevant caselaw establish that once the EPA brings 
an enforcement action under section 9607, the agency is subject 
to challenges to its response action.   
 Courts have held that liability and cost-effectiveness 
suits filed by potentially responsible parties to challenge a 
selected response plan were premature when the EPA had not yet 
sought enforcement through a cost-recovery action.  Those 
opinions describe the suit for reimbursement of response costs as 
the opportunity for challenging the EPA's remedial or removal 
decisions.  See Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509, 1512 
(1st Cir. 1991) (en banc) (section 9613(h) precludes "review of 
`innocent landowner' and `overbroad lien' claims prior to the 
commencement of an enforcement or recovery action"); Voluntary 
Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380, 1390 n.21 (5th 
Cir. 1989) ("`[O]nce the cost-recovery action is brought, the 
alleged responsible party can assert all its statutory and 
nonstatutory defenses and can obtain a complete declaration of 
its rights and liabilities.'" (quoting B.R. MacKay & Sons, Inc. 
v. United States, 633 F. Supp. 1290, 1297 (D. Utah 1986))); 
Barmet Aluminum Corp. v. Reilly, 927 F.2d 289, 295 (6th Cir. 
1991) (CERCLA scheme "merely serves to effectuate a delay in a 
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plaintiff's ability to have a full hearing on the issue of 
liability and does not substantively affect the adequacy of such 
a hearing"); Dickerson v. EPA, 834 F.2d 974, 978 (11th Cir. 1987) 
(property owner may contest cost effectiveness of the EPA remedy 
as soon as cost-recovery suit is brought). 
 Legislative history similarly indicates that review of 
challenges is available once a cost-recovery action is brought. 
"Therefore, the [section 9613(h)] amendment reaffirms that, in 
the absence of a government enforcement action, judicial review 
of the selection of a response action should generally be 
postponed until after the response action is taken."  H.R. Rep. 
No. 99-253 (III), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3045.  One member of Congress noted that  
"[w]hen the essence of a lawsuit involves 
contesting the liability of the plaintiff for 
cleanup costs, the courts should apply the 
other provisions of section [9613(h)], which 
require such plaintiff to wait until the 
Government has filed a suit under [sections 




132 Cong. Rec. 29,754 (1986) (statement of Rep. Roe). 
 The pattern of precluding review of challenges until a 
cost-recovery action is brought is clear enough where the EPA 
does not file suit until after all of its work has been 
completed.  Congress, however, authorized the EPA to seek 
reimbursement for costs even before the conclusion of the cleanup 
process.  42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2) permits a cost-recovery action 
to be brought as soon as "costs have been incurred."   
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 The question thus becomes whether the exception under 
subsection 9613(h)(1) would lift the bar to challenges against 
response actions even where the EPA brings a cost-recovery suit 
before cleanup is complete, as is permitted under subsection 
9613(g)(2).  Because an interim decision on costs may affect the 
completion of the project, such suits introduce an additional 
factor into the jurisdictional question. 
 Nothing in the timeliness language of either 
subsections 9613(g)(2) or 9613(h)(1) indicates any 
differentiation between the scope of an action where all the 
remedial work has been completed and one filed while the project 
is still in progress.  Section 9607(a)(4)(A) does limit a party's 
liability in a cost-recovery action, however, to costs 
"incurred."  Thus, in an action brought before a project has been 
completely carried out, reimbursement is limited to expenses 
"incurred" before the date of judgment, leaving to future 
litigation costs that come due thereafter.  
 Once it has been established that subsection 9613(h)(1) 
applies and that review under that exception is available, a 
court must then resolve the question of what types of challenges 
may be considered and what remedies are available.  Although the 
statute makes no distinction between cost-recovery suits brought 
after completion of a project and those brought while work is 
continuing, the remedies may differ because of the possibility of 
affecting future work at a site.   
 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) sets out defenses to liability vel 
non as contrasted with disputes over the amount of the claim due 
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or the legality of the remedy selected.  In United States v. 
Hardage, 982 F.2d 1436, 1446 (10th Cir. 1992), the Court held 
that a responsible party may contest EPA expenditures as well as 
its liability in a response action.  In that case, the Court of 
Appeals, citing section 9607(a)(4)(A), concluded that a person 
found to be a responsible party may nevertheless contest payment 
of expenses resulting from a remedial action that is inconsistent 
with the National Contingency Plan.  Id. at 1443, 1447. 
 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9605, the EPA has published a 
National Contingency Plan for the effective removal of hazardous 
substances in 40 C.F.R. pt. 300, regulations that set out 
procedures for the selection of response actions.  These 
regulations direct the EPA to evaluate alternative remedies, 
weighing such factors as the overall protection of human health 
and the environment, long-term effectiveness, reduction of 
toxicity through treatment, potential environmental impacts of 
the remedial action, cost feasibility, and availability of 
services and materials, among others.  See id. 
§300.430(e)(9)(iii)(A)-(I), .430(f)(1)(i).  Remedial actions 
inconsistent with the policy objectives of the National 
Contingency Plan may be challenged in defending a cost-recovery 
action.  42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A). 
 Potentially responsible parties may also defend cost-
recovery actions on the ground that the EPA's decision in the 
selection of a response action was "arbitrary and capricious or 
otherwise not in accordance with law."  42 U.S.C. § 9613(j)(2).   
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 When a defense on these grounds is successful, the 
available remedies are listed in section 9613(j)(3):     
"[T]he court shall award (A) only the 
response costs or damages that are not 
inconsistent with the national contingency 
plan, and (B) such other relief as is 
consistent with the National Contingency 
Plan."   
 
 
42 U.S.C. § 9613(j)(3).  The language of that section makes it 
clear that the available remedies are not limited to a mere 
reduction of the amount recoverable for expenditures, but may 
also include any relief consistent with the National Contingency 
Plan.   
B.  Citizens' Suit Exception Under Subsection 9613(h)(4) 
 An indication of the scope of judicial review 
contemplated by Congress may be found in another exception to the 
jurisdictional bar -- the citizens' suit provisions of subsection 
9613(h)(4).  42 U.S.C. § 9659 authorizes any person, including a 
potentially responsible party, to sue the government on 
allegations that the EPA violated a regulation or requirement of 
the Act or failed to perform non-discretionary acts or duties. 
Some notice requirements are also imposed in section 9659(d)-(e). 
The district court is given authority to enforce CERCLA standards 
or regulations, to direct action necessary to correct the 
violation, and to impose civil penalties.  Id. § 9659(c). 
 Subsection 9613(h)(4) grants a district court 
jurisdiction to review challenges raised by a citizens' suit, but 
some doubt exists about when such a suit may be entertained.  The 
13 
legislative history on that point is confusing, and the issue is 
a troublesome one that has been the subject of several appellate 
opinions.   
 In Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1095 (7th Cir. 
1990) and Alabama v. EPA, 871 F.2d 1548, 1557 (11th Cir. 1989), 
the Courts of Appeals decided that even if a remedy or a discrete 
phase of a remedy has been selected by the EPA, no citizens' suit 
challenge may be recognized before the remedy has been completed. 
The opinions in those two cases noted that the language of the 
citizens' suit exception of section 9613(h)(4) applies only to 
those "removal or remedial action[s] taken under section 9604 
[response actions by EPA] . . . or secured under section 9606 
[abatement order] . . . ."  Schalk, 900 F.2d at 1095 (emphasis in 
original); see Alabama v. EPA, 871 F.2d at 1557.  Noting the 
statute's use of the past tense, the Courts of Appeals stated 
that absent clear legislative intent to the contrary, the 
statutory language establishes that the remedial action must 
already have been implemented and completed before challenges can 
be made against it.  Id.   
 In the Schalk case, incineration had been selected as 
the form of remedy, but had not yet been put into operation.  In 
those circumstances, the Court concluded that it lacked 
jurisdiction to consider a citizens' suit in which it was alleged 
that the EPA had violated the National Contingency Plan by 
failing to prepare an environmental impact statement.  Schalk, 
900 F.2d at 1095; see also Alabama v. EPA, 871 F.2d at 1556 
(citizens' suit alleged EPA failed to comply with notice and 
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comment provision); Arkansas Peace Ctr. v. Arkansas Dep't of 
Pollution Control & Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212, 1216-19 (8th Cir. 
1993) (citizens' suit alleged incineration remedy failed to meet 
EPA regulations), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 114 S. Ct. 1397 
(1994).   
 Although these interpretations of the timing of the 
review of citizens' suits have superficial pertinency, none of 
the Courts of Appeals were confronted with bona fide assertions 
of irreparable environmental damage resulting from violations of 
CERCLA's policies.0  In circumstances where irreparable 
environmental damage will result from a planned response action, 
forcing parties to wait until the project has been fully 
completed before hearing objections to the action would violate 
the purposes of CERCLA.  This concern was articulated in 
congressional deliberations and elicited conflicting statements 
by members of the conference committee that was convened to 
resolve differences between the Senate and House versions of 
SARA.   
 Whether a challenge raised in a citizens' suit may be 
reviewed under subsection 9613(h)(4) depends upon whether the 
challenge is directed at remedial action that is "taken" or 
"secured" in violation of the statute.  42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(4). 
                                                           
0Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1991), 
discussed allegations that the response action would cause 
irreparable harm to historic artifacts and did not involve a 
situation where EPA action caused injury to the environment in 
violation of CERCLA.  See id. at 1023. 
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In discussing the proper timing of a citizens' suit, some courts 
have quoted the comments of Senator Thurmond, who stated:   
"`Taken or secured,' [in section 9613(h)(4)] 
means that all of the activities set forth in 
the record of decision which includes the 
challenged action have been completed. . . . 
The section is designed to preclude lawsuits 
by any person concerning particular segments 
of the response action . . . until those 
segments of the response have been 
constructed and given the chance to operate 
and demonstrate their effectiveness in 
meeting the requirements of the act. 
Completion of all of the work set out in a 
particular record of decision marks the first 
opportunity at which review of that portion 
of the response action can occur."   
 
 
132 Cong. Rec. 28,441 (1986).  For comments along similar lines 
in the House debate, see 132 Cong. Rec. 29,736 (1986) (statements 
of Rep. Glickman).   
 These statements, however, must be contrasted with 
those made by other conferees.  For example, Senator Stafford, 
the Chairman of the Committee on Environment and Public Works 
(the Senate Committee primarily responsible for the bill) warned: 
"It is crucial, if it is at all possible, to maintain citizens' 
rights to challenge response actions, or final cleanup plans, 
before such plans are implemented even in part because otherwise 
the response could proceed in violation of the law and waste 
millions of dollars of Superfund money before a court has 
considered the illegality. . . . [C]itizens asserting a true 
public health or environmental interest in the response cannot 
obtain adequate relief if an inadequate cleanup is allowed to 
proceed . . . ." 
 
 
Id. at 28,409.  For similar statements made in the House debates, 
see id. at 29,754 (statement of Rep. Roe).   
 In his comments, Senator Mitchell noted the difference 
between responsible parties whose interests are purely financial 
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and citizens or responsible parties whose concerns are with 
public health or environmental damage.  The Senator said: 
"Clearly the risk to the public health is 
more of an irreparable injury than the 
momentary loss of money. . . . The public, 
however, has no recourse if their [sic] 
health has been impaired.  For this reason, 
courts should carefully weigh the equities 
and give great weight to the public health 
risks involved."   
 
Id. at 28,429.    
 Another conferee, Representative Florio spoke to the 
point:   
"A final cleanup decision, or plan, 
constitutes the taking of action at a site, 
and the legislative language makes it clear 
that citizens' suits under [section 9659] 
will lie alleging violations of law and 
irreparable injury to health as soon as --and 
these words are a direct quote [from 
subsection 9613(h)(4)] -- `action is taken.'" 
 
 
Id. at 29,741.   
 From these conflicting views of the members of Congress 
who directly participated in the drafting of the statute, one 
might be tempted to resort to the wag's statement that, when the 
legislative history is unclear, one should refer to the language 
of the statute.  However, in this instance it must be conceded 
that the term "action taken" in subsection 9613(h)(4) does not 
speak in clear terms either.  See Neighborhood Toxic Cleanup 
Emergency v. Reilly, 716 F. Supp. 828, 833 (D.N.J. 1989) ("[T]he 
statute's language fails to answer the question of how much must 
be done before review is available.").   
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 Senator Stafford's comments supply a pragmatic 
guideline to interpretation.  He said that 
"the courts must draw appropriate 
distinctions between dilatory or other 
unauthorized lawsuits by potentially 
responsible parties involving only monetary 
damages and legitimate citizens' suits 
complaining of irreparable injury that can be 
only addressed only [sic] if a claim is heard 
during or prior to response action."   
 
 
132 Cong. Rec. 28,409 (1986); see also Cabot Corp. v. EPA, 677 F. 
Supp. 823, 829 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (recognizing differences between 
compensatory and irreparable injury in selecting proper remedies 
under subsections 9613(h)(1), (h)(4)).     
 The problem may be illustrated by an extreme scenario 
that has the EPA deciding to take leaking drums containing a 
highly toxic substance from a dump site and to empty them into a 
nearby lake, thus causing permanent damage to public health and 
the environment.  If citizens cannot prevent such dumping from 
taking place, no effective remedy exists.   
 The citizens' suit provision is effectively nullified 
if litigation must be delayed until after irreparable harm or 
damage has been done.  In such circumstances, a statutory 
interpretation that calls for the full completion of the plan 
before review is permitted makes the citizens' suit provision an 
absurdity.  That conclusion is further supported by the language 
of 42 U.S.C. § 9659(c) authorizing equitable relief, in that a 
court may "enforce" a regulation or "order" an officer to perform 
a specific duty.  Invoking those powers would affect future 
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actions by the agency.  See the musings in North Shore Gas Co. v. 
EPA, 930 F.2d 1239, 1245 (7th Cir. 1991) (in some cases, section 
9613(h) would do more than affect the "timing" of judicial 
review; it would extinguish it).   
 Several district courts have grappled with the timing 
of review under the citizens' suit exception and have reached 
inconsistent results in cases where irreparable harm to public 
health or the environment was alleged.  Cabot Corp., 677 F. Supp. 
at 829, for example, concluded that "[h]ealth and environmental 
hazards must be addressed as promptly as possible rather than 
awaiting the completion of an inadequately protective response 
action."  In Neighborhood Toxic, 716 F. Supp. at 834, the court 
commented that even where there are allegations that a remedial 
plan is unsafe to public health, review of a citizens' suit is 
only allowed after the first phase of the cleanup is complete. In 
that case, however, plaintiffs did not assert that they could 
prove environmental harm, but merely demanded that the EPA 
perform a public health study to support its choice of remedy. 
Id. at 829. 
   In the Courts of Appeals cases previously cited, where 
the citizens' suits were held to be premature, allegations of 
genuine irreparable damage were not discussed and presumably were 
not present.  The issue presented here appears to be a case of 
first impression in the appellate courts.  With this general 
background on the law, we review the parties' contentions.      
19 
II. 
 Gamma-Tech asserts that when the EPA filed the suit for 
response costs, the district court obtained jurisdiction, 
including its inherent injunctive powers, over all challenges to 
the government's selection of a remedy for the polluted site. 
Although it relies on subsection 9613(h)(1), Gamma-Tech asserts 
that the citizens' suit exception in subsection 9613(h)(4) 
supports justiciability of contentions that the EPA's action 
violates CERCLA by being inconsistent with the National 
Contingency Plan.0  Gamma-Tech also maintains that the Due 
Process Clause requires a party to be given an opportunity to 
prevent irreparable harm before it occurs. 
 The EPA argues that its cost-recovery action seeks only 
reimbursement for the actual expenditures incurred as of the time 
of the suit, and that subsection 9613(h)(1) does not permit 
challenges to portions of a response action not yet completed and 
for which costs have not yet been incurred.  Moreover, the EPA 
contends that courts do not have the power to grant equitable 
relief in a section 9607 cost-recovery action.   
 The EPA does concede that Gamma-Tech may contest its 
liability for actual costs claimed by the government that are 
inconsistent with the National Contingency Plan.  However, 
relying on this Court's opinion in Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 
                                                           
0Gamma-Tech's position is somewhat equivocal.  In its brief, 
Gamma-Tech relied on subsection 9613(h)(4) jurisdiction, but at 
oral argument stated that it based its claim only on subsection 
9613(h)(1).  However, the issue we address is the jurisdiction of 
the district court at the time it entered its order.  
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923 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1991), the EPA maintains that because the 
remedy has not yet been fully implemented, the citizens' suit 
provision does not permit judicial review despite allegations of 
irreparable harm.  
 In Boarhead, a property owner sought to enjoin the 
EPA's cleanup activities until the agency conducted appropriate 
reviews under the National Historic Preservation Act.  We held 
that CERCLA's jurisdictional provisions prevailed over the 
Preservation Act.  Id. at 1023.   
 Boarhead is clearly distinguishable and does not 
control the matter before us for two crucial reasons.  First, 
Boarhead was brought by a property owner and was not, as here, a 
suit brought by the government where the exception in subsection 
9613(h)(1) comes into play.  Second, the case before us is based 
on allegations that the EPA has violated and will continue to 
violate CERCLA itself, not another unrelated statute -- a point 
that the Court noted and did not decide.  See id. at 1019 n.13. 
Consequently, Boarhead and the other previously cited cases where 
the property owners brought suit prematurely do not govern a 
court's power to grant injunctive relief in the circumstances 
where there are allegations that the EPA's action will cause 
irreparable harm inconsistent with the National Contingency Plan. 
 In assessing the scope of review and the availability 
of remedies in this cost-recovery action, it is important to 
clarify just what it is that the EPA seeks in this suit.  The 
complaint alleges that, as of September 28, 1990 (approximately 
five months before the complaint was filed), disbursements by the 
21 
government amounted to at least $1,816,151.  The EPA seeks this 
sum and, in addition, all response costs incurred "as of the date 
of judgment."   
 The EPA, therefore, seeks reimbursement for part of the 
expense of implementing the pumping and treating remedy that is 
scheduled to be in operation before this case returns to the 
district court.  When the case reaches trial, some costs will 
have been incurred for every phase of the remedial plan, although 
only a portion of the anticipated expenses for the pump treatment 
processing will have been incurred by then.   
 That being so, Gamma-Tech is free to challenge those 
phases that have been completed and also that portion of the 
remedial plan that has not yet been fully completed as of the 
date of judgment, but for which some expenses have been incurred. 
The timeliness requirement of section 9613(h) has been met as to 
everything claimed as of the date of judgment.  We thus have no 
need to consider here whether under different circumstances, the 
commencement of a cost-recovery action under section 9607 would 
allow challenges to all aspects of the remedial plan even if no 
expenses have been incurred for a specific phase to come into 
effect in the future.   
 The next issue is the scope of the relief that Gamma-
Tech may obtain.  Compliance with the National Contingency Plan 
criteria previously mentioned (e.g., protection of public health 
and the environment, including the overall feasibility of the 
plan) is a substantial factor in determining what costs the EPA 
may recover from Gamma-Tech.  As noted earlier, section 
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9613(j)(3) outlines the scope of the remedy that the district 
court may grant.  If the response the EPA has selected is 
determined to be arbitrary and capricious, or "otherwise not in 
accordance with law," the court is only permitted to award the 
response costs that are consistent with the National Contingency 
Plan.  The court may also grant "such other relief as is 
consistent with the National Contingency Plan."  42 U.S.C. 
§9613(j)(3) (emphasis added).   
 Notably, section 9613(j)(3) does not exclude injunctive 
relief as a remedy.  The broad language "such other relief" 
implies the contrary.  See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 
305, 320 (1982) ("[A] major departure from the long tradition of 
equity practice should not be lightly implied."); Califano v. 
Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 705 (1979) ("Absent the clearest command 
to the contrary from Congress, federal courts retain their 
equitable power to issue injunctions in suits over which they 
have jurisdiction."); Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 
361 U.S. 288, 291-92 (1960) ("When Congress entrusts to an equity 
court the enforcement of prohibitions contained in a regulatory 
enactment, it must be taken to have acted cognizant of the 
historic power of equity to provide complete relief in light of 
the statutory purposes.").   
 Therefore, if the response selected by the EPA is 
inconsistent with the National Contingency Plan -- for example, 
the remedial plan is harmful to public health -- nothing in the 
statute prohibits a court from utilizing its inherent power to 
direct the agency to cease the harmful practice and, in addition, 
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to deny claims for expenses incurred to that point in carrying 
out that phase of the remedy.    
 Permitting the EPA to continue with actions that have 
been found to be inconsistent with the National Contingency Plan 
would be contrary to the spirit and intent of CERCLA.  The Act is 
designed to facilitate the cleanup of hazardous waste sites, but 
that process must be conducted by methods that meet specified 
criteria.  Thus, in some circumstances, granting injunctive 
relief would be consistent with the National Contingency Plan 
pursuant to the provisions of section 9613(j)(3) and, in fact, 
injunctions may be required to insure compliance with the Plan. 
We therefore reject the EPA's contention that injunctions, per 
se, are barred in a suit for response provisions costs.   
 Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 
840 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1988), is not to the contrary.  In that 
case, a private entity sought an injunction directing other 
parties to commence cleanup operations.  In considering the 
interplay between section 9606 that allows only the government to 
seek an order directing cleanup and section 9607 that arguably 
only calls for reimbursement of costs, the Court held that 
section 9607 did not confer a private right of action.  Id. at 
697.  To the same effect, see New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 
F.2d 1032, 1049 (2d Cir. 1985).   
 Those situations are quite different from the one 
presented here, and the Courts' opinions in those cases did not 
discuss the remedies provision in section 9613(j)(3).  Moreover, 
the injunctive relief sought in Cadillac Fairview was not 
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directed against the federal government in its capacity as a 
regulator, but merely as the owner of a hazardous waste site.    
 Both parties have cited to the citizens' suit provision 
in subsection 9613(h)(4) as support for their respective 
positions.  Even though it is a potentially responsible party, 
Gamma-Tech could qualify as a plaintiff in a citizens' suit 
alleging irreparable harm to the environment.  Hence, Gamma-Tech 
argues that as a defendant in the EPA's cost-recovery suit, it 
should be permitted to allege matters that would normally be 
considered in a separate citizens' suit.  
 The EPA, on the other hand, takes the position that a 
citizens' suit will not lie in the circumstances presented here 
because the remedial action at the pollution site has not yet 
been completed.  The EPA relies on such cases as Schalk, Alabama 
v. EPA, and Arkansas Peace Ctr.  As we noted earlier, however, we 
find the holdings in those cases to be inapposite to the facts 
presented here, where bona fide assertions of irreparable 
environmental damage were made.   
 We are persuaded that when irreparable harm to public 
health or the environment is threatened, an injunction may be 
issued under the citizens' suit exception of subsection 
9613(h)(4) even though the cleanup may not yet be completed.  As 
discussed earlier, delay in preventing such injury is contrary to 
the objectives of CERCLA and results in the evisceration of the 
right to the remedy envisioned by the citizens' suit provision. 
We are convinced that Congress did not intend such a result.  
 It follows that if the section 9613(h)(4) exception 
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allows an injunction to be issued in a separate citizens' suit 
that is filed simultaneously in the same court with an answer0 to 
a cost-recovery action for which review is available under 
section 9613(h)(1), there is no logical basis to deny similar 
relief in the cost-recovery litigation when irreparable harm has 
been established.  
 The EPA's objection to an injunction appears to be 
based, to a large extent, on the potential for interference with 
future work at a polluted site.  But that possibility exists in 
every case in which the agency brings its cost-recovery action 
before conclusion of the work to be performed at the site.   
 It is clear that if a court finds that an aspect of the 
response action already completed was contrary to the National 
Contingency Plan, the judgment could not include the expenses 
attributable to that particular activity.  It would be highly 
unlikely that the EPA would continue to spend money on that same 
remedial activity in the future if it knew that the recovery of 
costs for that work from the responsible party would not be 
permitted in later suits.  Nor is it likely that the EPA would 
continue its course of action in the face of a court decree that 
its remedial processes have failed to comply with the law.  Thus, 
future work is affected to the extent that a denial of 
reimbursement for a particular item is, for all intents and 
purposes, a finding that a particular aspect of a project 
violates applicable law.   
                                                           
0Or sixty days later if compliance with the redundant sixty-day 
notice provision of section 9659(d)-(e) would be required. 
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 Interim judicial review is often advantageous to the 
EPA.  If a court upholds the legality of a response action and 
the costs thus far incurred, the likelihood of a settlement with 
a responsible party at the conclusion of the cleanup is 
substantially increased.  On the other hand, if a court finds 
defects in the EPA's response action, they may be corrected 
before further unwarranted drains on limited Superfund resources 
occur -- a result the EPA would no doubt find desirable.  A knee-
jerk opposition to a reasonable interpretation of the 
jurisdictional limitations on judicial review in CERCLA is 
therefore not consistent with the aims of the Act.   
 Based on our review of the statute, its legislative 
history, and the procedural posture of this suit, we hold that 
where a bona fide allegation of irreparable injury to public 
health or the environment is made, injunctive relief is available 
in a cost-recovery action under subsection 9613(h)(1).   
 Our holding does not mean that frivolous litigation 
will be permitted to delay critical cleanup efforts.  Courts must 
be wary of dilatory tactics by potentially responsible parties 
who might raise specious allegations of irreparable harm to 
public health or the environment merely to obtain immediate 
review.  The mere possibility of such abuse, however, does not 
justify an abdication by the courts of their responsibility to 
adjudicate legitimate claims of irreparable harm.   
 Our holding on jurisdiction does not imply that relief 
must be granted here.  We note first that the parties' versions 
of the facts are in dispute, and perhaps more important, 
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Congress' intention that cleanup not be delayed or diverted by 
dilatory litigation must be honored.  To overcome that 
admonition, Gamma-Tech, as the alleged responsible party, has the 
burden to establish that the EPA's choice of remedy was indeed 
arbitrary and capricious or otherwise contrary to law.    
 In cases like the one at hand, a reviewing court should 
give deference to the scientific expertise of the agency.  This 
is not a circumstance where a court is called upon to simply 
acquiesce in a determination of law; rather, this is a situation 
where an administrative agency does possess expert knowledge in a 
factual and scientific field.  See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983) 
("When examining this kind of scientific determination, as 
opposed to simple findings of fact, a reviewing court must 
generally be at its most deferential."); United States v. Akzo 
Coatings of Am., Inc., 949 F.2d 1409, 1424 (6th Cir. 1991); Hi-
Craft Clothing Co. v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 910, 915 (3d Cir. 1981). 
 In this connection, it is noteworthy that section 
9613(j)(1) provides that judicial review is limited to the 
administrative record.  That section does provide, however, the 
exception that "[o]therwise applicable principles of 
administrative law shall govern whether any supplemental 
materials may be considered by the court."  42 U.S.C. 
§9613(j)(1).  The district court must, therefore, apply general 
administrative law in determining whether additional 
supplementary information should be added to the court record.   
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 Because we have concluded that in the circumstances of 
a case like this, a district court does have jurisdiction to 
consider property owners' allegations of irreparable harm, we 
need not address the due process issue. 
III. 
 Gamma-Tech has also challenged the district court's 
order denying a motion to file certain pleadings after the dates 
specified in the pre-trial order had passed.  As we said in 
Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 449 (3d Cir. 1982), our 
scope of review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) is limited to issues 
that are "inextricably bound" to the grant or denial of a 
preliminary injunction.  A court's order enforcing a pre-trial 
time table does not fall within that category.  Therefore, we 
will not review the court's order at this time.   
 Accordingly, the order of the district court will be 
reversed insofar as the court held that it had no jurisdiction to 
review the contentions of irreparable harm and the request for an 
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injunction.  The case will be remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
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United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, Inc., No. 93-5252. 
 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 I agree with the majority that the district court had, 
and we have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(1).  I reach 
this conclusion because I think it would be anomalous to say, for 
example, that because the remedy it chose was arbitrary and 
capricious, the EPA could not recover in a cost recovery action 
for wells already drilled, but the propriety of its decision 
regarding all the future wells in the same response phase would 
not yet be ripe for review.  It seems to me that when the EPA 
opens the door by bringing a cost recovery suit while a response 
action remains in progress, common sense and judicial economy 
require us to review both the completed work and those similar 
portions of the response phase that are either planned or 
partially completed.0 
 I part company with the majority, however, on the issue 
of whether the citizens' suit provision codified at section 
9613(h)(4) provides an additional and independent basis for 
federal jurisdiction.  The majority suggests that whenever 
irreparable harm to the environment is alleged, jurisdiction for 
                                                           
0I doubt, however, whether we would have jurisdiction to review 
future planned phases of a cleanup where funds have not yet been 
expended.  In such a case, it seems likely that Congress only 
intended that those phases of the cleanup in progress or already 
completed would be ripe for review in federal court.  See United 
States v. Charles George Trucking Co., 682 F. Supp. 1260, 1272 
(D. Mass. 1988); United States v. Mottolo, Nos. 83-547-D, 84-80-D 
(D.N.H. Dec. 17, 1992). 
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judicial review is established by that subsection.  To the 
extent, of course, that section 9613(h)(1) independently provides 
a source of jurisdiction, the question of whether jurisdiction is 
also present under section 9613(h)(4) is unnecessary to the 
result the majority reaches and its observations regarding that 
subsection are dicta. 
 I would not reach the issue of jurisdiction under 
section 9613(h)(4) because I believe Gamma-Tech clearly waived it 
at oral argument in the following exchange: 
MR. NUCCIARONE:  This is not -- the 
presentation by [Gamma-Tech] is not founded 
on the citizens' suit provision, Your Honor. 
. . . 
 
THE COURT: It is not? 
 
MR. NUCCIARONE: It is not.  And that is an 
erroneous analysis that Judge Fisher made, 
Your Honor.  So you are . . .  
 
THE COURT: So you were alleging jurisdiction 
only under the reimbursement suit? 
 
MR. NUCCIARONE: Correct.  And that is why the 
cases the government relies on are of little 
aid to this court. 
 Moreover, it is undisputed that Gamma-Tech has not 
complied with the requirements of CERCLA section 9659(d)(1), 
which provides that a citizens' suit may not be brought until 
sixty days after the plaintiff has notified the violators of the 
Act and both the federal and state governments.  Because this 
notice is lacking, there is simply no jurisdiction under the 
citizens' suit provision.  See Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 
F.2d 1011, 1019 n.13 (3d Cir. 1991).  And while it might be 
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argued that because the EPA has already filed a cost recovery 
action the notice provision would be superfluous, courts have 
interpreted the requirement of notice in environmental actions 
strictly. 
 In Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 110 S. 
Ct. 304 (1989), certain property owners sued against their county 
government, alleging that the county's sanitary landfill violated 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).  They failed, 
however, to give the notice required by the statute.  The 
district court held that by notifying the state and federal 
agencies one day after the defendant moved for summary judgment, 
the plaintiff cured any defect in notice.  The Supreme Court, 
however, after noting that a variety of environmental statutes 
contain similar provisions, disagreed: 
[T]he notice and 60-day delay requirements 
are mandatory conditions precedent to 
commencing suit under the RCRA citizen suit 
provision; a district court may not disregard 
these requirements at its discretion. 
Id. at 31, 110 S. Ct. at 311. 
 Likewise, in Greene v. Reilly, 956 F.2d 593 (6th Cir. 
1992), the plaintiff sued under the Clean Water Act.  Although he 
did notify the EPA that he considered it in violation of the Act, 
the plaintiff did not formally threaten to sue.  The Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, although acknowledging that the 
EPA had some notice of the violation and was aware of the 
situation generally, nevertheless held that noncompliance with 
the formal notice requirement barred the suit.  Id. at 594. 
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 Accordingly, I am convinced that the federal courts do 
not have jurisdiction to the extent this case is argued as a 
citizens' suit. 
 Moreover, even if the citizens' suit were not barred by 
waiver and procedural default, I do not believe that section 
9613(h)(4) provides jurisdiction until the remedial work 
complained of is actually completed.  Every United States Court 
of Appeals that has construed this section has so held.  These 
holdings are based on a textual analysis of the statute, which 
refers in the past tense to removal or remedial action taken or 
secured, and on CERCLA's legislative history.  See Arkansas Peace 
Center v. Arkansas Dep't of Pollution Control & Ecology, 999 F.2d 
1212, 1216-17 (8th Cir. 1993) (discussing cases), cert. denied, 
114 S. Ct. 1397 (1994); North Shore Gas Co v. Environmental 
Protection Agency, 930 F.2d 1239, 1244-45 (7th Cir. 1991); Schalk 
v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1095 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 
981, 111 S. Ct. 509 (1990); State of Alabama v. United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, 871 F.2d 1548, 1557-58 (11th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 991, 110 S. Ct. 538 (1989).0 
                                                           
0See also City of Eureka v. United States, 770 F. Supp. 500, 502 
(E.D. Mo. 1991); Neighborhood Toxic Cleanup Emergency v. Reilly, 
716 F. Supp. 828, 830-34 (D.N.J. 1989) (discussing cases); Frey 
v. Thomas, No. IP 88-948-C, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. 20383, 1988 U.S. 
Dist LEXIS 16,967, 1988 WL 20383 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 6, 1988).  One 
district court within our circuit, however, has expressed a 
contrary view.  In Cabot Corp. v. United States Environmental 
Protection Agency, 677 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Pa. 1988), PRPs sued 
the EPA over a remediation plan.  The district court first held 
that section 9613(h)(1) barred review until EPA filed an action 
to recover costs, then held that section 9613(h)(4) must be read 
as encompassing only those citizens' suits that would not 
otherwise be deferred by the other portions of section 9613(h), 
including section 9613(h)(1).  Id. at 828. Then, in dictum, it 
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 Beyond the plain language of the statute, a section 
such as 9613(h) that withdraws federal jurisdiction from suits 
brought against the United States is essentially a reassertion of 
sovereign immunity, and it is a basic principle of law that 
"[w]aivers of immunity must be construed strictly in favor of the 
sovereign, and not enlarged beyond what the language requires." 
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685, 103 S. Ct. 3274, 
3278 (1983) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see 
Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380, 1385 
(5th Cir. 1989) (applying Sierra Club to section 9613).  Thus, 
even if the plain language of the statute were equivocal on the 
timing of review, it would still not support a waiver of 
sovereign immunity, and we should not imply one unless the 
legislative history in favor of such a construction is 
compelling.  Cf. Smith v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 898 
F.2d 907, 912 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 The legislative history of CERCLA, however, hardly 
compels the conclusion that Congress intended the broad judicial 
review that the majority holds is available.  Instead, as the 
majority purports to recognize, "Congress was anxious to 
safeguard EPA removal efforts from delay resulting from 
litigation brought by potentially responsible parties."  Majority 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
went on to discuss genuine citizens' suits and opined that such 
actions may be brought even before the proposed remedy is 
implemented, based largely on its view of CERCLA's legislative 
history.  Id. at 828-29.  Notably, however, the Neighborhood 
Toxic court, as well as the courts in Alabama and Frey, rejected 
Cabot and its reading of the legislative history.  As I discuss 
infra, so do I. 
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typescript at 5.  That desire was equally present for the 
circumstances presented here. 
 In considering and reporting out H.R. 2817, which was 
later incorporated into H.R. 2005 and passed, the Committee on 
Energy and Commerce said of what is now section 9613(h): 
The section is intended to codify the current 
position of the Administrator and the 
Department of Justice with respect to 
preenforcement review: there is no right of 
judicial review of the Administrator's 
selection and implementation of response 
actions until after the response action [sic] 
have been completed to their completion. 
H.R. Rep. No. 253(I), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1985), reprinted 
in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2863.  Indeed, a thorough review of 
the legislative history reveals no evidence whatsoever that 
Congress intended anything other than a judicial review of 
completed response actions under the citizens' suit provision. 
See H.R. Rep. No. 253(III), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-23 (1985), 
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3045-46 (House Committee on 
the Judiciary, emphasizing that judicial review must be postponed 
until after the response action is taken and completed); H.R. 
Rep. No. 253(V), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-26 (1985), reprinted in 
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3124, 3148-49 (House Committee on Public Works 
and Transportation, referring to actions taken in past tense). 
 In fact, the Conference Report accompanying the 
Superfund Amendments of 1986, which is the most persuasive 
evidence of congressional intent,0 states, in pertinent part: 
                                                           
0See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416, 421 
(7th Cir. 1993); RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. United States, 955 F.2d 
1457, 1462 (11th Cir. 1992); Demby v. Schweiker, 671 F.2d 507, 
510 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (opinion announcing judgment of court). 
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 [A]n action . . . would lie following 
completion of each distinct and separable 
phase of the cleanup.  For example, a surface 
cleanup could be challenged as violating the 
standards or requirements of the Act once all 
the activities set forth in the Record of 
Decision for the surface cleanup phase have 
been completed. . . . Any challenge under 
this provision to a completed stage of a 
response action shall not interfere with 
those stages of the response action which 
have not been completed. 
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 223-24 (1986), 
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3316-17. 
 Rather than coming to grips with the conference report 
and the reports of the standing committees that reported out the 
CERCLA amendments, the majority seeks support in conflicting 
statements made on the House and Senate floors by individual 
conferees.  See majority typescript at 15-17.  Yet, it is a well-
established principle of statutory interpretation that 
contradictory floor statements by individual members, even the 
sponsors of the bill, are of extremely limited authority and 
cannot override the committee and conference reports.  See Brock 
v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 263, 106 S. Ct. 1834, 1840-41 
(1986); Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76, 105 S. Ct. 479, 
483 (1984); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311, 99 S. Ct. 
1705, 1722 (1979). 
 The majority nevertheless concludes that absent a 
jurisdictional exception where irreparable harm is alleged, the 
citizens' suit provision would be rendered a nullity and an 
absurdity.  Majority typescript at 18.  Even if that is so, it is 
clear from the legislative history that Congress carefully 
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considered the timing of review issue and was well aware that 
environmental contamination could irreparably damage both the 
environment and human health.  Nevertheless, it chose not to 
provide a jurisdictional exception for irreparable harm.  See 
Hanford Downwinders Coalition, Inc. v. Dowdle, 841 F. Supp 1050, 
1062 (E.D. Wash. 1993).  And while Congress' decision on that 
issue might not comport with the policy views of certain members 
of the public and the judiciary, it is simply not our function as 
a reviewing court to act as a super-legislature and second-guess 
the policy choices Congress made.0 
 I therefore respectfully concur in the judgment. 
                                                           
0Moreover, as the Dowdle court pointed out, id., irreparable 
harm, whether explicitly asserted or not, was present on the 
facts of Arkansas Peace Center, Schalk and Alabama, cited by the 
majority as having only "superficial pertinency."  Majority 
transcript at 13-14.  Yet, each of these courts held that 
judicial review was not available under section 9613(h)(4). Thus, 
for the majority's view of section 9613(h)(4) to be correct, 
these decisions by three other courts of appeal would have to be 
repudiated outright. 
 
